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Abstract
This paper argues that the implications of globalization for monetary policy
come mainly through two channels: On the one hand, the many structural
changes, which are associated with the globalization process, cause an
increase in uncertainty surrounding monetary policy. This leads to an increase
in uncertainty about how to interpret macroeconomic data/indicators and
about the monetary transmission mechanism. On the other hand, by
strengthening the process of global economic integration, the globalization
process increases international competition. Thereby, globalization forces
market players to make structural adjustments or reforms which change the
conditions or constraints under which monetary policy is implemented.
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Recently, a debate about the implications of globalization and information
technology (IT) innovations for monetary policy has begun (see Issing
(1999), Brash (2000), Buiter (2000), Ortiz (2000), Remsperger (2000), Solans
(2000), Vickers (2000), Wadhwani (2000), and Wagner (2000a, b)).
This paper argues that these implications come mainly through two channels:
On the one hand, the many structural changes, which are associated with the
globalization process, cause an increase in uncertainty surrounding monetary
policy. This leads to an increase in uncertainty about how to interpret
macroeconomic data/indicators and about the monetary transmission
mechanism (Issing (1999), Solans (2000)). On the other hand, by
strengthening the process of global economic integration, the “globalization”
process increases international competition. Thereby, globalization forces
market players to make structural adjustments or reforms which change the
conditions or constraints under which monetary policy is implemented
(Wagner (2000a)). This in turn can lead to changes in monetary policy targets,
in monetary policy strategies and instruments, and in the optimal institutional
framework for monetary policy. Both channels of influence are analyzed in
this paper, and some policy implications are drawn. First, however, what is
meant by globalization in this paper is defined.
Globalization is a widely used term, but is in fact rather vague. It usually
refers to the growing economic interdependence of countries worldwide
brought about by the increasing volume and variety of cross-border
transactions in goods and services and of international factor flows, and also
through the more rapid and widespread diffusion of technology.
A main impetus for this globalization process which has been steadily
increasing over the past three decades
2 has, up to now, been the increased
integration and globalization of the financial markets. This has been aided by
the abolition of capital controls and by a drastic decrease of transaction costs
thanks to new communication and information technologies.
3
7
2 Global (world-wide) economic integration, however, only became possible through the
breakup of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in the period after 1989.
3 See e.g. Wagner (1999a). This technological progress is one main component of what is
called the “New Economy”. The second main component is globalization.This increased integration and globalization of the financial markets, based on
major technological and structural developments
4 which have lowered the costs
of transactions, information and mobility, increasingly exposes private agents
and governments to international competition. This process of competition is
regarded as being or becoming effective not only in the goods market, but also
in the markets for mobile production factors. This exposure to international
competition manifests itself in the movement of mobile production factors
(nowadays in particular of capital) to countries that offer the highest (risk-
denominated) rate of return. This, however, increases a country’s costs of
maintaining inefficient and overly regulated market structures.
In this paper, the term “globalization” is broken down to some important
underlying factors or developments (technological and/or structural changes),
and it will be asked how these factors or developments affect monetary
policy. Globalization influences monetary policy in different and complex
ways. When we speak of the implications of globalization and IT innovations
for monetary policy in this paper, we mean the following: do they ease or
impede the attainment of the main tasks of monetary policy which are, in
particular: (i) prevention of inflation (and deflation); (ii) stabilization of the
economy (in cooperation with other economic policies).
Nowadays the prevention of inflation (or price stabilization) is increasingly
considered to be the major task of monetary policy by most governments and
central banks worldwide. We find strong arguments in this paper which
confirm the view that globalization supports monetary policy by tending to
reduce inflation. However, as we shall argue, this should not induce central
banks to reduce their efforts or alertness to keeping inflation in check. The
international competition for mobile capital will force the central banks to
stay their course of primarily fighting inflation. However, the many structural
changes associated with the globalization process (including the IT
8 Introduction
4 On the whole, globalization is built and dependent upon structural change on the
technological level as well as on the political and socio-cultural level, partly transmitted or
enhanced by institutions such as GATT/WTO, and major political shocks such as the breakdown
of the communist regimes. These technological and institutional changes or shocks, together,
paved the way for global economic integration (global trade, capital flows and diffusion of
technology). One should, however, emphasize that the globalization process is still in its
evolutionary phase; see for example Okina et al. (1999), Obstfeld (2000) and footnote one above.innovations, which function as the technological basis of the globalization
process
5), lead to an increase in the uncertainty surrounding monetary policy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II analyzes a channel of influence
on monetary policy, which is based on an increase in competition through
global economic integration. We show that this channel may explain
a tendency towards a decline in inflation (pressures), which is persistent but
which may only become fully effective after a time lag. Section III examines
channels which derive from an increase in uncertainty that arises from
structural changes, in particular from the IT innovations associated with the
globalization process. This uncertainty, which tends to be only transitory, is
however immediately effective, and covers various fields. For instance, there
is uncertainty about how strongly monetary policy should react to output and
inflation gaps and how big these output and inflation gaps are. At the end of
the Sections II and III, policy implications are analyzed. Section IV concludes
the paper.
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5 The relationship between globalization and the IT innovations can be understood as a two-
sided one. The IT innovations not only function as the technological basis for the globalization
process, the globalization process itself, by intensifying the international competition process,
enhances the innovation process by forcing the economic agents to accelerate their efforts towards
technological innovations.II. Persisting Effect of Globalization: Increase in Competition
A. Integration and Competition
In the Introduction, globalization was defined as a technologically and
politically driven process of global economic integration which increasingly
exposes private agents and governments to international competition.
We can differentiate between different levels or fields of competition.
• In the private sector (on a microeconomic level), global economic
integration, which is effective not only on the financial, but also on the
goods and labor market, leads to lower price markups and lower excess
wage. “The disciplining effect of global financial markets applies ... also to
the private sector, by making it more difficult to sustain unwarranted price
markups and nonproductivity driven wage increases” (Citrin and Fischer
(2000, p. 27)). This effect of globalization, however, will tend to result in
one-time downward shifts in the price level rather than ongoing restraints
on the rate of inflation.
• In the state sector (on a macroeconomic level), global economic integration
leads to new, fiercer competition on the world market as new countries
(competitors) enter the global market. The increased openness to trade and
capital flows, based on liberalization and deregulation, particularly on the
financial markets, increases the locational or infrastructural competition
between regions and countries. This in turn forces governments to reduce
inefficiencies.
This paper focuses on this locational competition (the competition in the state
sector) since this type of competition tends to result in ongoing restraints on
the rate of inflation rather than only one-time downward shifts in the price
level. Therefore, this type of competition has more significant implications
for monetary policy because, as emphasized in the introduction, prevention of
inflation (or price stabilization) is now the central task of monetary policy.
On the concept of locational competition
Locational competition means that countries and regions have to provide
good infrastructure (better infrastructure than competing countries or regions)
11to attract mobile production factors. Good infrastructure increases the
incentive for foreign direct investors to invest in this country or region and
improves the chances of domestic firms attracting foreign mobile production
factors or keeping their own productive factors from moving outward.
6 Here
various so-called locational or infrastructural factors matter, for example on
the national level: legal security (property rights, contract enforcement),
social security, economic and political stability; and on the regional level:
cultural offers or infrastructure, housing, roads, safety etc. In this paper, we
concentrate on macroeconomic stability as a key locational factor on the
national level. Major indicators or signals of macroeconomic (in)stability are
inflation, debt and tax burden (Fischer (1991)).
7
By reducing these undesired macroeconomic factors to a level which is lower
than in competing locations, governments can try to attract mobile capital
from other locations and to keep domestic mobile capital (human capital as
well as financial and real capital and investment) from moving outward into
other countries or regions. In other words, globalization induces stronger
locational competition between countries or regions for mobile capital.
8
Pressures on governments to implement structural reforms
It is known that governments have an important role to play in creating the
conditions that attract foreign direct investment (FDI) and in maximizing the
positive contribution that FDI can make to growth and development
(UNCTAD (1999)). Globalization in the above sense forces governments to
exercise greater fiscal discipline and to ensure sound institutional and
political frameworks. In other words, it does “act as a force for stability by
limiting the scope for countries to pursue policies that are incompatible with
medium-term financial stability” (Citrin and Fischer (2000, p. 27)). Thus,
governments feel pressured by the (globalization-driven) locational
competition to promote international competitiveness through
12 Persisting Effect of Globalization: Increase in Competition
6 However, the domestic firms also have to fulfil their own part of the task insofar as they have
to supply (comparatively) attractive work conditions and remuneration.
7 In Iwd (1999) it is reported that a questionnaire survey of 454 German firms, organized by
the Confederation of German Industry and of the Society for Promotion of the Protection of
Foreign Investments, established that macroeconomic conditions in the form of weak growth and
high inflation were the deficiencies most frequently criticized as hindering foreign direct
investment by the firms questioned.
8 On the concept of “locational competition” (Standortkonkurrenz) see in more detail Siebert
(1995), (1996), (2000), and Lorz (1997).macroeconomic stability particularly by lowering taxes, government debt,
and inflation (as will be examined in more detail below).
In the following, we concentrate on the effects on inflation, as inflation is the
main target variable of monetary policy. We argue that locational competition
tends to reduce (trend) inflation directly as well as indirectly.
9 This may be
interpreted as a possible basis for the “new paradigm” view of inflationless
growth (which is different from and supplements the one which is based on
the argument of ongoing productivity growth). However, as we shall also
argue, there are some caveats on this view insofar as there are some trade-off-
relationships between the different locational factors or reform costs which
have to be considered. After presenting the basic idea, some models and their
results are presented.
B. Effects on Inflation
In the public discussion about globalization, there is an often-used hypothesis
which assumes that globalization leads to a systematic decline in inflation;
some even speak of the “death of inflation” (Bootle (1996)). To test this
hypothesis, various models are analyzed and all the results suggest that
globalization may reduce inflation. Most of the models will be discussed in
this chapter. One model, however, is discussed in Section III.C because it is
based on an increase in uncertainty about the monetary transmission
mechanism which is investigated in Section III.C.
The basic model
We formulate a mainstream Barro and Gordon (1983)-type model of
macroeconomic policy and inflation. Policy is assumed to minimize the
following quadratic loss function:
(1)
where  π and  y denote inflation and employment (or output growth)
respectively, π* and y* are society’s most preferred values for inflation and
employment (or output growth), and b is the relative weight on fluctuations
in these two variables.
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9 See also Citrin and Fischer (2000) who argue that an aspect of globalization that is “likely to
have a long-lasting influence on inflation is the discipline on domestic financial policies imposed
by increased financial market integration” (p. 26).The loss function is minimized under the constraint of an expectations-
augmented short-run Phillips curve
y=y n +c (π – π
e) – ε (2)
where ε is a supply shock (with mean 0 and variance σε
2) and yn can be
interpreted as the natural rate of employment (or output growth). It is assumed
that yn <y *and (at first) that c=1.
Furthermore we add the demand side of our model being represented by
π = m + v (3)
where m is the growth rate of money and v is a velocity shock (with mean 0
and variance σv
2).
In addition, we assume rational expectations information so that
π
e = E(π | yn) = E(m | yn) (4)
where E is the mathematical expectations operator.
Then, as is widely accepted in the literature,
10 we can derive an inflation bias
of b(y* – yn) from the difference between the optimal rate of inflation,
πO = π * + [b/(1+b)] ε (5)
and the discretionary rate of inflation
πD = π * + b(y* – yn) + [b/(1+b)] ε . (6)
For supplementary remarks on this basic model see Appendix I.
11
Direct effects of integration: The Romer case
The recent literature has identified openness as one of the countervailing
forces that lessen the incentive to inflate. The argument which is originally
due to Romer (1993) is that, the more open the economy, the smaller the real
benefits of higher output from surprise monetary expansion, and thus the
14 Persisting Effect of Globalization: Increase in Competition
10 See Persson and Tabellini (1999).
11 During the last decade, the question has increasingly been raised whether the inflation bias
argument has not been overstated or is losing relevance as a substantiation for central bank
independence and in general (see Blinder (1998), Vickers (1998), and McCallum (1995, 1997a)),
who believe that contemporary central banks target potential output). If this is really the case, it
may partly be attributed to the increasing institutional competition (between countries and regions)
caused by the globalization process. However, it is likely that even if the inflation bias argument
has been overstated or is losing relevance, the underlying problem of dynamic inconsistency is
still prevalent, in particular in developing and transitional countries.lower the equilibrium rate of inflation. As domestic output increases, the
terms of trade worsen: the more open the economy, the larger the fraction of
foreign goods in domestic consumption, and the greater the welfare loss from
the terms of trade loss. In short, more open economies may be blessed with
a lower incentive to inflate.
12
Since globalization goes hand in hand with more open economies, the
surprise inflation effect, which induces a lower increase in output, can be
interpreted as one effect of globalization that is relevant for monetary policy.
In the above model context, this effect would mean that the Phillips curve is
steeper (dπ/dy = 1/c increases). This would reduce the inflation bias:
πD
Romer = π* + cb(y* – yn) + [cb/(1+c
2b)] ε , where 0 < c < 1.
13 (7)
In the following, however, we shall investigate in more detail different
models which may also substantiate a decline in inflation but are based on
locational competition induced by globalization.
Indirect effects: Implications of an increase in locational competition
(High) inflation is an undesirable locational factor and a locational
disadvantage in a globalized world,
14 mainly because inflation is regarded as
a signal of bad policy and political and economic instability.
15 As bad policy
and political and economic instability are relevant locational factors or
disadvantages, this contributes to capital flight in a globalized economy
(Wagner (2000a)). The costs of a capital drain stem from the fact that
investors and (productive) mobile factors are the basis of economic growth.
When firms and mobile capital leave the country (or region), this means a loss
of (potential) production, a decrease in the (potential) output, an increase in
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12 Lane (1997) showed that the prediction that more open economies have lower equilibrium
inflation rates is true independently of the terms of trade mechanism emphasized by Romer
(1993). The mechanism linking the welfare effects of monetary surprises, and hence the incentives
to inflate, to openness does not depend on a large-country terms of trade effect but rather is due to
imperfect competition and nominal price rigidity in the nontraded sector.
13 The corresponding output is y = yn – [1/(1+c
2b)] ε.
14 See, for example, the empirical results in Autschbach (1997, pp. 147, 184).
15 See for example, Shiller (1997) and Mankiw (1999). In addition, it is often believed that
(high) inflation may reduce economic growth, even though previous empirical evidence that links
inflation with overall economic performance is not particularly robust. Still, some empirical
studies are available that show that there has been a negative correlation between the rate of
inflation and the rate of economic growth (Fischer (1993), Judson and Orphanides (1996), and
Barro (1997)). With high inflation, at very least, intertemporal resource allocation is misguided. In
addition, the functioning of financial intermediation, which plays an important role in
intertemporal resource allocation, is weakened.unemployment and a decrease in productivity (particularly if, as is often the
case, the most productive factors and the most innovative investors are the
most mobile ones). This tendency for capital flight in the case of bad
locational factors (such as high inflation) is stronger, the higher the
integration and globalization of the financial markets is.
16 By contrast, the
host country (recipient) profits from attracting foreign mobile capital. It
profits from technology transfer because foreign direct investment (FDI)
allows the labor force in the host country to become better trained. In
addition, FDI generates profits and tax revenues in the host country.
17
Inflation, however, works like taxation. The real effective capital income tax
rate rises as inflation increases.
18 The effects on capital income taxes are
a main mechanism by which the tax system becomes nonneutral to inflation.
Here, however, we have to differentiate between the short term and the long
term. (Physical) capital can be withdrawn from one use, and directed toward
another, only gradually.
19 The fact that capital is thus not very mobile in the
short term means that capital income can be a target for redistributive policy
(see Wildasin (2000)). Inflation or expansionary (inflation-producing) policy,
can be looked at in the same way. That is, inflation can be regarded as a form
of source-based capital income tax (see Feldstein (1997)). Over time,
however, when there are not favorable conditions, capital flows out of the
jurisdiction, causing labor productivity and income to fall. That is, inflation
may not only be regarded, as economic theory suggests, as a phenomenon that
leads to misallocation of resources, but it may also reduce economic growth.
20
Therefore, governments, unless they are very myopic, when deciding about
structural priorities, will consider the costs of a capital drain and of not being
able to attract foreign capital which functions as a source of financing
investments and economic growth.
21 But it may be argued that governments
16 Persisting Effect of Globalization: Increase in Competition
16 See Berger (2001).
17 Feldstein (2000). Furthermore the foreign owners of capital can profit from FDI as they can
benefit from economies of scale.
18 See Feldstein (1997, 1999). The consequence of an increase in source-based taxation of
mobile capital has recently been analyzed by Wildasin (2000), who demonstrates how competition
among countries for mobile resources constrains their ability to alter the distribution of income.
19 In practice, it is costly to add, refurbish or replace plant and equipment. This is also the case
with adjustments in the level of employment (see Hamermesh and Pfann (1996)). The adjustment
costs, however, vary from company to company, and from asset to asset.
20 See Fischer and Modigliani (1978), and Wagner (1983).
21 See also Siebert (2000, p. 30): “The government is confronted with a restricted scope for
action as the tax basis shrinks when real capital moves away. Moreover, labor productivity
declines when real capital flows out. Thereby, the wage and employment chances decrease.
Thereby, the tax basis also shrinks. Governments must consider these potential effects of an
exodus of capital when making decisions.” (Translation)and politicians are myopic and therefore, as long as (physical and human)
capital is not very mobile in the short term, will tend to neglect this aspect.
However, the possibility and attractiveness for capital to fly or move to other
locations tends to increase with the degree of international capital mobility,
i.e. financial integration. In other words, financial globalization reduces the
term during which capital is not very mobile. Hence one can expect that
gradually, with the increase in financial integration, even myopic politicians
will soon attach greater importance to the target of preventing inflation. They
will then show more fiscal discipline insofar as, when adverse demand shocks
occur, they produce less conflicts with monetary authorities about releasing
monetary restrictions set up to prevent inflation.
Moreover, increasing factor mobility tends to limit the effectiveness and the
attractiveness of redistributive, inflationary policies (Wildasin (2000)). This
means that there will be fewer conflicting interests between fiscal and
monetary policy, so that preventing inflation may become easier for a central
bank. In other words, the conditions for price stability policy become more
favorable.
Furthermore, as mentioned in the beginning of this section, inflation is
regarded by the public as a signal of bad policy and political and economic
instability. But not only inflation as the result, also the mere attempt or the
inclination to comply with the incentive of raising output (or compensating
output losses, from capital drain) by a surprise inflation can be regarded as an
indicator of bad policy and economic instability and will consequently be
punished by capital drain. Hence one may guess that globalization thereby
will gradually reduce the inflation bias.
The above argument suggests that the increase in the costs of inflation
represents an effect which takes place only with a certain delay.
22 We have
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22 However, there is also an immediate effect based on the role of currency competition. An
increase in the international mobility of portfolio capital leads to stabilization policies (monetary
policy, fiscal policy and even wage policy) in the individual countries being subject to greater
control by the financial markets. For example, if the central bank of a country does not undertake
a price stability orientated policy, whereas the central banks of other countries do, the external
value of the currency of this country will decline. If the citizens of this country perceive this
devaluation as a signal that the stabilization policy of their country has not been successful and
thus lose confidence in this policy, then the government comes under pressure to give up this
policy of instability. An example for this is the reorientation of the policy course of the French
Government in 1983. In March 1983, France totally revised its economic policy, which during the
years before was directed towards stimulation of the internal demand. A continued high inflation
rate, increasing current account deficits and increasing foreign debts finally led to a devaluation
of the French franc. emphasized that (physical) capital can be withdrawn from one use, and
directed toward another, only gradually. In other words, it takes a while until
the costs of a capital drain and of the consequent loss of output occur and
before a pressure arises which forces a government to install reform measures
in order to reduce these costs. Over a certain period of time, globalization may
even create inflation-increasing effects as is shown in the following. There we
argue that inflation itself can be understood as the result of inefficient
structural conditions.
23 These inefficiencies, which supposedly can only be
reduced by (costly) structural reforms, are considered to be the consequence
of a (rational) delay of reforms. Therefore, inflation itself (as well as the other
locational hindrances mentioned) can be regarded as the consequence of
a delay of (or failure to) reform. The macroeconomic effects of the increase
in the costs of inflation caused by globalization can be modeled in different
ways. Here we only analyze two models. First, we integrate these costs into
the supply curve of the basic model (equation (2)) by arguing that the costs of
a delay of reforms and of reform unwillingness
24 rise (model approach
I below).
25 Here we have to consider that there are also costs of implementing
reforms.
26
Besides of this model variant which (like the Romer case) reflects a change
in macroeconomic conditions, we also analyze below a second variant which
includes changes in the preferences induced by the discernment of the
increase in the output costs of inflation (model approach II).
Model approach I: Increase in the costs of a delay of reforms
27
In this section, inflation is considered to be the result of inefficient structural
conditions. We consider an economy in which the socially desired level of
18 Persisting Effect of Globalization: Increase in Competition
23 See Wagner (2000a). This can be traced to a failure to make reforms in areas such as labor
market rigidity, or financial and monetary policy aspects, for example inappropriate taxation and
government debt or central bank dependency.
24 Since inflation is a public bad, reform unwillingness should not be regarded as an individual
phenomenon but as the result of coordination problems among societal groups.
25 Another way of modeling this idea within the above basic model structure would be to
introduce direct output costs of (higher) inflation (beyond the level of that of competing countries)
into the supply function. However, as in the version presented above, this – perhaps surprisingly
– does not necessarily strengthen the inflation-reducing effect of globalization found in the Romer
case above. The reason is rather simple. In the above time inconsistency (basic model) approach,
the output loss caused by (relatively higher) inflation automatically produces an incentive to create
an inflation surprise to compensate for the output loss. Consequently, there are two counteracting
effects.
26 See Saint-Paul (1996). While the costs of a delay of reforms may be thought of rising when
globalization increases, the costs of implementing reforms may be assumed to be exogenous.
27 I would like to thank Friedrich Kißmer for suggesting this case to me.output can only be reached when government implements reforms r*. The de
facto implemented reforms r may fall short of r* because reforms are costly
for the government. We denote this positive difference r* – r > 0 as backlog
or delay of reform. We suppose that a backlog or delay of reform implies
higher unemployment and lower production (see Calmfors (1998)).
The supply function is
y = y* + c(π – π
e) – a(r* – r) – ε, (8)
where (r* – r) = “delay of reform”, and y* – a(r* – r) = yn .
In this case, for reasons of simplicity, we set c = 1 and ε = 0 and normalize y*
to 0. Based on the arguments above, we assume that globalization, through an
increase in locational competition and in capital mobility, in time leads to an
increase in production losses caused by a given delay of reform. That is, this
aspect of globalization is denoted, in a comparative-static sense, by da > 0
(a once-for-all increase in a).
Economic policy is conducted by two policy actors, the government and the
central bank. The government, on the one hand, fixes the level of reforms (r).
It minimizes the following loss function:
L
Gov = 0,5((π – π*)
2 + b(y – y*)
2 + zr
2), where y* = π* = 0, b, z > 0 (9)
We assume that the implementation of reforms is associated with political
costs (z > 0) for the government.
The central bank, on the other hand, decides about the rate of inflation by
minimizing the loss function L
CB.
L
CB = 0,5((π – π*)
2 + bCB(y – y*)
2), where y* = π* = 0, b ≥ bCB > 0 (10)
This loss function does not include r since we assume that the central bank is
“independent” and not responsible for the implementation of the reforms.
28 In
addition, in analogy to Rogoff (1985), we assume that the central bank might
not weigh output stability as highly as the government does (bCB ≤ b).
Furthermore, to simplify calculations, we assume in the following that the
target levels for inflation and output (in logarithm) are zero (y* = π* = 0).
The macroeconomic outcomes depend upon whether the economic
policymakers are committed or act in a discretionary way vis-à-vis the public.
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28 This assumption is not of significance for the result here.Furthermore, when monetary policy is discretionary, we have to distinguish
between Nash- and Stackelberg equilibria.
Monetary policy rule
In the case of monetary policy commitment, we do not have to differentiate
between whether the reform by the government follows a rule or is
discretionary.
With committed monetary policy, on the basis of the model structure above,
we get the following solutions:
rR =  r*; 0 < r
R < r*( 1 1 )
πR = 0 = π* (12)
yR =  r* ; yR < 0 = y* (13)
From equation (11) we see that a delay of reforms is optimal for the
government if there are political costs of the implementation of reforms
(z > 0). This delay of reforms implies that output lies below its desired level
(see equation (13)). From equation (11) we also see that the aspect of
globalization considered here (expressed by da > 0) induces reforms.
29
Nevertheless, it leads to a loss in output if z > a
2b .
30
Discretionary monetary policy and committed reform
31
We assume the following timing of events:
(i)  First, the government chooses a policy rule r.
(ii)  The private actors form inflation expectations.
(iii)  Government implements the reforms that were chosen at step 1.
(iv)  Finally, the central bank chooses the rate of inflation.
20 Persisting Effect of Globalization: Increase in Competition
29 This can be seen from the derivation drR/da in equation (11).
30 This can be seen from the derivation dyR/da in equation (13).
31 The case of “discretionary monetary policy and discretionary reform”, in which we have to
distinguish between a Nash-equilibrium and a Stackelberg-equilibrium with leadership of the
government, is not analyzed here. The result would not be fundamentally different (Kißmer
(2001)). It can be shown however that the above threshold declines when reform is not credible.This game structure supposes that the government is credible to the private
actors and actually implements the plan for reforms chosen in step (i). The
government considers that its choice of reform has influence on the inflation
expectations and the rate of inflation chosen by the central bank. The
government thus behaves like a Stackelberg leader vis-à-vis the public and the
central bank.
From the first order condition of the central bank’s optimization problem, we get
π = π
e = ab CB (r* – r) (14, 15)
We see that the private actors only expect inflation just when there is a delay
of reform. The reason is that the central bank has a too ambitious output target
(y *=0>y n =– a (r* – r)). Hence, in the case of a delay of reform and
discretionary monetary policy, the central bank has an incentive to raise the
output by creating a surprise inflation.
However, the extent of reforms is not exogenously given but is determined
by the government. By inserting (14, 15) into the loss function of the
government, we can calculate inflation and output, after determining the
optimal level of reforms. The solutions of the Stackelberg equilibrium (SR)
with committed reform are
rSR =  r* ; 0 < rR < rSR < r* (16)
πSR =  r* ; πSR > 0 = πR (17)
ySR =  r* ; yR < ySR < 0 (18)
From equation (16) it follows that, with discretionary monetary policy,
a delay in reform is optimal (rSR <  r*), if there are political costs of an
implementation of reforms (z > 0). However, the extent of the delay of reform
is smaller compared with the case of a committed monetary policy; hence the
output is higher.
From equation (17) we see that, with discretionary monetary policy, a delay
of reform leads to higher inflation (πSR – πR > 0).
32
Persisting Effect of Globalization: Increase in Competition 21
32 When there is a delay of reform (which exists when z > 0, see equation (16)), the output
level remains below the desired level. Therefore, there is an incentive for the discretionary
monetary policy to increase the output by producing a surprise inflation. Since this is anticipated
by the private actors and the government, the monetary policy contains an inflation bias.Which effect does this aspect of globalization have here? The results show
that, as in the case of a committed monetary policy, globalization leads to an
increase in reforms. Whether it leads to so-called “New Economy effects”
(dπ/da ≤ 0 < dy/da), depends upon the extent of the reforms implemented, or,
in other words, upon the degree of reform aversion z. If z < a
2(b + bCB
2),
globalization creates New Economy effects, i.e. raises production and lowers
inflation. If, z > a
2(b + bCB
2), however, globalization (in the above sense) leads
to lower production and higher inflation.
Interim conclusion
In this comparative-static model variant, we have shown that globalization
(denoted by its effect of an increase in the costs of a delay of reforms, i.e. of
da > 0) decreases inflation if z < a
2x, where x = b + bCB
2 in the above case.
However, if z >  a
2x, globalization can create undesired macroeconomic
effects, i.e. it can increase inflation and decrease output. Above, however, we
have introduced globalization as a dynamic process. Therefore, one may be
inclined to assume that globalization gradually increases the output costs of
a delay of reforms (i.e., of a),
33 so that eventually (apart from extreme cases,
34
where z 6 ∞) the condition z < a
2x will be effective and inflation will decline.
This, however, can not be derived from the above model because in every
case, when a increases, the extent of the backlog or delay of reforms (r*–r)
declines. However, what can reasonably be assumed, is that over time the
general understanding of the necessity of reforms increases so that the
political costs of reforms (z) decrease. This eventually would have the
consequence that the condition z < a
2x will be effective and inflation will
decrease. Alternatively one can also think of other changes in the loss
functions of the government, of the society or of the central bank. This will
be described in the following.
Model Approach II: Changes in preferences and institutions
In the above models (in the Romer case as well as in the case of costs of
a delay of reforms) we have denoted the consequences of globalization by
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33 The stronger the global economic integration is, the stronger will be the pressure of
competition, and the greater will then be the output loss of a delay of reforms (expressed by high
inflation), i.e. the larger will be a.
34 The reform unwillingness in a country can be derived from country-specific coordination
problems with respect to the means of reform and to the corresponding distribution of the reform
costs. It thus is the result of specific social conditions; see e.g. Alesina and Drazen (1991),
Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992), Drazen (2000), Chang (2001).a change in the restrictions on the optimization problem. However, we can
also denote them by a change in the loss function. For instance, one can model
the consequences of globalization as a gradual understanding of the necessity
of making reforms reacting to the more and more costly inflation (if
a threshold
35 has been exceeded). This can be reflected in a decrease of the
political costs of or the aversion to reforms (z), as mentioned above. It,
however, can also find expression in other changes of preferences. This has
been described in Wagner (2000a) where, by extending the basic model
above, different cases have been analyzed, assuming that the inflation-cost-
increasing effect of globalization can be modeled alternatively as leading to
• a higher aversion to inflation
• a lower preferred inflation rate
• an additional cost factor in the loss function of the central bank or of the
government
• an additional cost factor in the loss function of the society.
It is shown there that although the consequences differ in detail, depending on
the modeling assumptions, all these cases come to the result that globalization
decreases inflation. In most of the cases, globalization also reduces the inflation
bias of a society. And in the last case, it even leads to a systematic undercutting
of the socially desired rate of inflation. Here, however, we shall only briefly
analyze one of these cases and then go on to deal with some institutional
supplements (namely central bank independence and exchange rate pegging),
which have been extensively used in practice over the last decade.
Case (A): A higher aversion to inflation
We can assume that the facts of the higher costs of inflation and lower
benefits of surprise inflation described above are going to be understood and
internalized by society, leading to a higher aversion to inflation, i.e. a lower
b, denoted b’. This is reflected in a rising acceptance among the public that
the key objective of monetary policy should be to deliver low inflation, and
that fiscal policy should not rely on the inflation tax. A higher aversion to
inflation in turn leads to an inflation reduction by reducing the inflation bias.
That is, the equilibrium inflation rate will be
πD
case A = π* + b’(y* – yn) + [b’/(1+b’)] ε, where b’<  b .
36 (19)
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35 In the model approach I, the threshold was expressed by the condition: z = a
2x.
36 The corresponding output is y = yn – [1/(1+b’)] ε.This can easily be derived from the basic model above.
37
Now, to strengthen this effect, various institutional ways to further reduce the
inflation bias can be taken into consideration. Two of them have been
implemented in many countries during the last decade(s). These are central
bank independence and exchange rate pegging.
Case (B): Implementation of Central Bank Independence (CBI)
In the 1990s, numerous countries provided their central banks with greater
legal independence from the government. This trend towards increased
central bank independence has been witnessed in both industrialized and
developing countries. Within the former socialist countries of Central and
Eastern Europe, economic transition has also been accompanied by
substantial central bank reforms granting greater ‘goal’ and ‘instrument’
independence.
38
Usually central bank independence is interpreted in the following way:
societies attribute independence to central bankers who have the same loss
function as the societies but a different personal value of b (a lower b, denoted
b”). The appointed central bankers then set monetary policy according to
their own preferences. From the basic model structure above, this gives the
equilibrium outcome:
πCBI = π* + b”(y* – yn) + [b’’/(1+b”)] ε. (19’)
However, this comes with the disadvantage of higher output or employment
volatility. From the above model structure one can derive the following
patterns of output or employment:
yD = yO = yn – [1/(1+b)] ε with discretion and with the optimal state-contingent
policy rule,
whereas with central bank independence yCBI = yn – [1/(1+b”)] ε.
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37 One comes directly to the result by looking at equation (6) in Appendix I.
38 In these former socialist countries, however, the question sometimes arises whether the
delegation of independence to the central bank is actual or only legal (see Cukierman (1998)). If
it is only “legal”, i.e. only exists on paper, as is still the case in many transitional countries, there
is a danger that it will not only be ineffective but even counterproductive (Wagner (1999c)).This means that output or employment volatility is greater with central bank
independence.
39 Nonetheless, if globalization leads to a higher aversion to
inflation and hence produces, for example, the inflation rate in equation (19),
one may conclude that globalization creates here the same disciplinary effect
as central bank independence. By comparing equations (19) and (19’) one
may, against the background of the costs of central bank independence
described above, conclude that central bank independence is then not needed
anymore, at least not in its function as a shield against the time-inconsistency
problem.
Globalization here has the same qualitative impact on the inflation rate as
central bank independence has. In case b’=  b”, the results coincide exactly,
so that central bank independence appears to become superfluous.
However, this interpretation is incorrect, at least if we stay within the model of
the world above. As long as society has b’ ≠ 0 (i.e., has some aversion to
inflation), the optimal b” (the appointed central banker’s personal value of b)
will always lie below b’. The solution can still be improved by central bank
independence, because the optimal (central banker’s) b” is a function of b’.
Globalization in the sense of areduction of b’does therefore not replace central
bank independence, but increases the degree of optimal inflation aversion of
the central banker. However, if we depart from the above model and no longer
measure central bank independence against b, but against the degree of
self-assertion of the central bank, it may in fact be possible to establish the
above hypothesis of a decline in the degree of optimum central bank
independence with ongoing globalization in the above meaning of equation
(19); see Eijffinger and Hoeberichts (1998) and Wagner (2000a, pp. 379-80).
Moreover, one may argue that the institutional competition, which was
described above as a characteristic of globalization, tends to make institutions
such as central bank independence into a“must” for anation in order to be able
to sell bonds on the international financial markets, at least at a “reasonable”
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39 This could, however, be reduced by a partial reduction of central bank independence, for
instance by implementing an overriding mechanism (see Lohmann (1992)). Here, the government
appoints a conservative central banker but threatens to terminate the contract if deviations from
the target inflation become too large. Moreover, central bank independence is found to reduce
electorally-induced volatility of output or employment (see Alesina and Gatti (1995); and Lippi
(1998), who provides evidence that could support this proposition). This aspect of a reduction in
the political economy cycle may also explain why the above hypothesis of greater output or
employment volatility with central bank independence has not been proven in many empirical
studies.price. Central bank independence can be regarded as akind of institutionalized
rating, as a quality label for transparency and financial solidity. This increases
the credibility of macroeconomic polices, thereby alleviating capital
borrowing on international capital markets and decreasing its costs.
Case (C): Exchange rate pegging
Another method of achieving price stability (more quickly), which is
frequently used by small countries in particular, is to peg the value of its
currency to that of a large, low-inflation country. The reasons for doing so are
as follows: When monetary policy is set with full discretion, there can be an
inflationary bias. Acentral bank which wants to combat inflation can commit
more credibly by fixing the exchange rate to that of a large, low-inflation
country. This creates low(er) inflation expectations, and thereby a low(er)
level of inflation for any given level of output.
However, while in 1991, 78 percent of all IMF member countries had some
degree of fixed or pegged exchange rate regime (hard or soft peg), this
number had dropped to 58 percent by 1998 (Fischer (2001)). In particular,
countries have moved away from the middle ground of pegged but adjustable
fixed exchange rates (soft pegs) towards the two corner regimes of either
flexible exchange rates or hard pegs, i.e. a fixed exchange rate supported, if
necessary, by a commitment to give up altogether an independent monetary
policy. The reason is that the experiences of the 1990s have shown that,
although adhering to a pegged exchange rate regime can be a successful
strategy for controlling inflation, it can promote financial instability. Against
the background of the tremendous increase in capital mobility and financial
globalization, which produces more rapid transmission of crises or shocks
across countries or continents, emerging countries with a large amount of
foreign-denominated debt in particular have experienced serious financial and
currency crises.
40 It is now widely believed that a global move toward greater
exchange rate flexibility, on the one hand, or toward fixed exchange rates, on
the other, would have diminished many of the problems that the international
financial system has suffered in recent years, although it is possible, or even
likely, that no exchange-rate regime would have prevented the recent crises in
the emerging-market economies.
41 In particular for most emerging market
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40Amain element of the crises was the weakness of the bank supervisory process which often
is prevalent in emerging markets and transitional countries; see Alba et al. (1998), Furman/Stiglitz
(1998), and Berg (1999).
41 See Frankel (1999), Mussa et al. (2000), Wagner (2000d).economies, floating exchange rate regimes appear to be the increasingly
relevant choice.
42 The reason is that these countries are increasingly
integrated with modern financial markets;
43 and the policy requirements for
maintaining a pegged exchange rate can be very demanding in circumstances
of high international capital mobility (Mussa et al. (2000)).
44
Beyond the relatively few ‘emerging markets’,
45 however, there are the
majority of developing and transitional economies. These economies do not
have highly sophisticated domestic financial systems. In addition, they are not
deeply integrated into the world capital markets, and they often still maintain
rather extensive controls on capital account transactions. For these
economies, pegged exchange rate regimes (in whatever form) can be viable
for extended periods, if monetary and fiscal policy can maintain reasonable
discipline. Nonetheless, when these economies become more developed and
more financially sophisticated, and when they are more integrated into global
financial markets, they also may be forced to consider regimes of greater
exchange rate flexibility.
46 The alternative is to adopt very hard pegs
(dollarization and monetary union).
47 However, even such corner solutions –
which, as mentioned, are not necessarily the best solution for all economies
48
– would have to be supplemented by further institutional measures or
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42 See Eichengreen et al. (1999).
43 Among countries with open capital accounts, soft pegs have proved to be crisis-prone and
not viable over long periods. The major part of the explanation for this is the impossible trinity of
a fixed exchange rate, capital mobility, and a monetary policy dedicated to domestic goals.
44 This does not exclude that, for certain emerging market economies, pegged exchange rate
regimes can be workable, despite substantial involvement with global financial markets. In
particular countries with a past history of poor inflation performance may find that only with
a very strong commitment mechanism to an exchange rate peg (as in a currency board or full
dollarization) can inflation be controlled.
45 Fischer (2001) listed 33 emerging market economies out of the then 182 members of the
IMF at the end of 1999.
46 See Wagner (1998, 2000e), Mussa et al. (2000).
47 Fischer (2001) states: “It is reasonable to believe, as EMU [European Monetary Union]
expands, and as other economies reconsider the costs and benefits of maintaining a national
currency ... that more countries will adopt very hard pegs, and that there will in the future be fewer
national currencies” (p. 10).
48 There are arguments in the literature that corner solutions are no real alternatives since
optimal policy implies ‘dirty floating’(Chang and Velasco (2000)). In particular, ‘dirty floating’is
contended to be optimal when inflation targeting is chosen as the basis for its monetary policy
(ibid). When exchange rate flexibility increases, it is important for a country to determine the basis
for its monetary policy. The record of inflation targeting is often regarded to be a good one in this
regard, see Bernanke et al. (1998), Fischer (2001); see, however, Masson et al. (1997), and Wagner
(1999b). The fact that obviously in practice there always (or mostly) is dirty floating (see Calvo
and Reinhart (2000) for an explanation), however, can be seen as the real danger so that a corner
solution such as dollarization just therefore may be the better alternative, see Reinhart (2000).innovations to minimize risks of future currency and financial market crises
(Fischer (1999)). Here we can differentiate between measures which
countries can take at unilateral or bilateral levels, at plurilateral or regional
levels, and at the multilateral or global level (Wagner (2000d)).
The conclusion is that a pegged exchange rate regime, although it may be
a successful strategy for controlling inflation, may increase financial
instability, in particular in emerging market economies. To minimize this
danger, a healthy banking system has to be installed. This, in addition to
a decrease in short-term debt denominated in foreign currencies as well as an
increase in holdings of international reserves may insulate countries from
financial crises.
Interpretation
On the basis of the above analyses and interpretations, one may come to the
conclusion that globalization tends to decrease (suppress) inflation
(pressures). However, the model of a delay of reform has shown that there is
no coercive pressure, however a tendency towards a greater of lesser decrease
in inflation in the medium term exists. This conclusion can be reaffirmed by
considering that not only inflation, but also high fiscal burdens (direct tax
load and indebtedness) have to be considered as typical negatively rated
locational factors in the locational competition between countries or
governments (UNCTAD (1999)).
On the one hand, this leads to what is called ‘fiscal discipline’ (see Wildasin
(2000), Citrin and Fischer (2000)). Effective locational competition in
a globalized economy involves fiscal discipline where governments tend to
compete with other countries or economies in reducing their expenditures
(hence their budget deficits and their indebtedness) and taxes to levels or
ratios which are similar to or even below those of competing countries or
economies.
49 This appears to make it easier for monetary policy to prevent
inflation, which can be regarded to be its central task.
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49 One should add, however, that this competition process is likely to be effective only among
countries or regions of similar development stages (Baldwin and Krugman (2000)) so that there
may be multiple equilibria. This implies that not all countries or regions in competition must head
towards the same rates of taxes, debts, or inflation, since there always remain structural differences
between these countries or regions. This is also the reason that the optimal degrees of structural
deregulation are different in different countries. Nonetheless, even competition among similarly
developed countries or regions leads to a pressure towards lowering ‘locational bads’ such as tax
loads, indebtedness, etc.Therefore, one may come to the conclusion that, as a result of globalization,
fiscal policy tends to become more disciplined and inflation will go down, so
that the ‘new paradigm’-view of inflationless growth in the ‘New Economy’
appears to be based on sound fundamentals.
On the other hand, however, there are some caveats with respect to this view
which may be relevant, in particular for developing and transition economies.
The main caveat is based on the following:
The described globalization-driven pressure on governments to reduce taxes
may increase the optimal share of seigniorage in financing governmental
expenditures. Why? We have mentioned the incentive to reduce government
debt and expenditure (that may end up in a ‘race to the bottom’) as an effect
of locational competition. There is, however, a trade-off: not only taxes,
expenditures and debt are important locational factors in the competition for
direct international capital investments; another important locational factor is
the infrastructure, which includes physical goods such as roads, ports or
telecommunications, institutional aspects such as property rights, contract
enforcement and, last but not least, educational goods (threshold levels of
skills are needed to attract inward investment).
50
Governments, however, can only finance this infrastructure by increasing
expenditure, if there is no politically accepted way of shrinking other
expenditures. This can only be done by raising taxes, increasing debt, or by
expanding seigniorage which, however, tends to produce inflation. The
government is therefore obviously captured in a trap or trade-off situation. All
three choices of financing this infrastructure are undesirable on the basis of
locational competition. However, by considering the trade-off situation, none
of these choices can be rated as bad per se since, for example, an increase in
taxes does not deter investment if these taxes finance public intermediate
inputs that are valued by firms and investors. A policy of inflation surprises
could well be regarded by a government as the least costly alternative (in
political terms) to finance the desired infrastructure. This is particularly the
case in developing or transitional countries (Wagner (1997)). Hence
governments there would have to raise the inflation target, and the inflation
bias would rise if the tax revenue becomes lower and lower and there are
necessary or desired higher expenditures for public goods (such as legal
security, education etc., which, as mentioned, are also important locational
factors in the competition for human capital and direct foreign investments).
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50 See Section II.A.This trade-off dilemma can only be overcome or mitigated if a government
succeeds in increasing economic growth. An increase in economic growth
would, as a by-product, also increase tax revenue with which the increased
expenditures on the desired infrastructure could be financed if government
does not want to increase debt. This is exactly the vision of a ‘New
Economy’.
51 An example of this is the United States in the 1990s. The
optimistic view on globalization expects, as by-products, increasing
productivity (growth) and a New Economy.
52 Whether this is realized,
however, is dependent upon certain microeconomic and institutional
adjustments or reforms which not every country is capable of easily
implementing because of politico-economic constraints.
53
C. Policy Implications
We have analyzed several arguments and models which support the view that
globalization tends to reduce the inflation (bias). Therefore, globalization
appears to improve the conditions for and thereby ease price stability policy
of central banks. Nevertheless, alertness is still needed because the conclusion
that globalization reduces inflation is not generally true. We have seen (in
model approach I) that there is even the possibility that globalization, under
certain circumstances, produces the opposite result. This is based on costs of
reforms. Moreover, as argued in the foregoing section, there are trade-offs
between different locational goods which a country tries to attain. Therefore,
there is no reason for central banks to conduct the price stability task under
globalization more laxly (or even for the government to reduce the degree of
central bank independence). It is quite the reverse: increased locational
competition forces the central bank to concentrate on and conduct price
stability policy even more carefully in order to attract or avoid a drain of
mobile capital. Furthermore, it has to be considered that, as globalization goes
hand in hand with or is based on IT innovations, the uncertainty which
surrounds monetary policy increases, as will be examined in the next chapter.
This increase in uncertainty tends to make the task of price stability policy
transitorily even more difficult.
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51 More details of this will be found in the following chapters.
52As argued above, the two main components of a New Economy can be seen in globalization
and productivity-increasing IT innovations.
53 See also Section IV. Another big hope, which is often expressed, is that globalization
enforces structural adjustments on the side of labor unions which may create disciplining inflation-
reducing effects.Nevertheless, when globalization is believed to suppress inflation pressures,
it may be tempting for specific social interest groups to pressure the central
bank to reduce its efforts in the fight against inflation in favor of the fight
against (for example) unemployment or economic recession. As examined in
this chapter, this may be justified by the argument that fiscal policy may be
bound by the disciplinary effects of the locational competition, which is
intensified by globalization. This might mean that governments are not able
(or are limited in their ability) to use fiscal policy (particularly an increase in
government expenditure which would raise government debt or taxes) for
expansionary stabilization policy actions. Monetary policy will then be made
more responsible for economic stabilization than it has been before. This
means that monetary policy will be expected to fight economic recessions,
mainly by lowering short-term interest rates.
If globalization tends to decrease inflation, it consequently will also diminish
nominal short-term interest rates, perhaps to very low levels. In a situation of
very low inflation and very low nominal short-term interest rates, however,
monetary policy may not be effective in its attempts to stimulate aggregate
demand during a recession, because of the zero bound on nominal interest
rates. This zero bound is a consequence of the fact that nobody will be ready
to lend money at negative nominal interest if cash is costless to hold over
time. In particular, the nominal inter-bank interest rate will not fall below zero
since electronic bank reserves can be stored at central banks for free.
54 This
could increase the danger that a cyclical downturn could push an economy
into deflation and stagnation.
55 Deflationary pressure may rise in a low
inflation environment due to difficulties of real wage adjustment and the
adverse effects of debt deflation and credit crunch.
56
Over and above this, it may be argued that central banks can be fooled by their
own credibility for low inflation (based, for example, on the increase in
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54 One could, however, think of some institutional solutions by which the central bank could
try to overcome the zero bound problem. For example, a central bank could establish a carry tax
on electronic bank reserves. Or a central bank could undertake aggressive open market purchases,
i.e. buy relatively illiquid assets, such as long-term bonds, and thus increase broad liquidity.
However, in order to be effective, the latter may require very large monetary injections. Moreover,
it may only be effective if the public believes that the central bank will do whatever it takes and
that the monetary stimulus will not be withdrawn before the recession is over. To help assure the
credibility of such a monetary policy, fiscal policy could indemnify the central bank against capital
losses. See Goodfriend (2000).
55 An example of this type of scenario can be seen in the recent problems in the Japanese
economy. See Goodfriend (2000).
56 See Shiratsuka (2000).competition induced by globalization described above) into being
insufficiently preemptive in a business expansion (Goodfriend (2000)).
Central banks may be inclined, in the belief of the inflation-suppressing
power of this competition, to delay monetary tightening when the economy
moves beyond a presumed level of non-inflationary potential output. If,
however, the economy continued to run above potential, the credibility for
stable prices would, at some point, self-destruct. This would create a jump in
inflation, so that the central bank would then be forced to react with tighter
monetary policy. It would produce, what is often called a ‘hard landing’ for
the economy. The outbreak of inflation would destroy a kind of implicit
reputational equilibrium in which price and wage setters kept their part of an
implicit bargain, which means that they did not inflate as long as the central
bank (or the globalization-driven competition) was expected to support its
commitment to price stability. An obvious conclusion, which is drawn, is that
a central bank should be sufficiently preemptive in a boom (see Goodfriend
(2000)).
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Uncertainty
A. Structural Changes and Uncertainty
In Section II, we analyzed various models which showed that globalization
tends to decrease inflation, though in most cases only with a certain time lag.
Without any time lag, however, the manifold structural changes associated
with the globalization process increase the uncertainty which surrounds
monetary policy.
57 In particular, the IT innovations, that function as the
technological basis of the globalization process,
58 induce this effect. This
effect of an increase in uncertainty, which is likely to be transitory, will be
analyzed by considering a central bank, whose strategy can be expressed by
a Taylor rule:
rt = r* + α(πt – π*) + β(yt – y*), α, β > 0 , (20)
where rt is the short-term real interest rate; r* is the long-term equilibrium
real interest rate; π* is the target inflation rate; πt is the current inflation rate;
y* is the potential output rate; and yt is the current output rate. “α” is the
weight ascribed to the inflation gap and “β” is the weight ascribed to the
output gap.
The ‘Taylor rule’ – which can be derived by combining a macro model,
consisting of a Phillips curve and an IS curve, with a policy target (and a loss
function) – represents the (optimal) reaction function or policy rule followed
by the policymaker under a certain monetary policy target regime. The model
may either be backward-looking (as in Ball (1997, 1999)) or forward-
looking
59 (as in McCallum (1997b)). The parameters α and β (when they are
not simply regarded as given, as in Taylor (1993)) reflect the weights of the
variability of output and inflation in the loss function of the central bank and
structural parameters of the economy.
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57 See Issing (1999). Issing refers to “Knightian” uncertainty that confronts central bankers,
referring to the often-cited difference between risk and (true) uncertainty (Knight (1921)).
58 As emphasized in the introduction, the present globalization process is hardly imaginable
without the driving force of the IT innovations. These IT innovations are the technological basis
or driving force of the globalization process insofar as they drastically reduce the transaction costs
of goods and factor mobility.
59 A forward-looking model includes expectations of future values of endogenous variables.We shall argue in this chapter that the structural (technological and political)
changes which substantiate or symbolize the globalization process increase
the uncertainty about the output gap (yt – y*) and the inflation gap (πt – π*),
as well as the uncertainty about the monetary transmission, mechanism and
hence about the weights (α, β).
As we are concerned with the impacts of globalization, one may think of
extending the basic Taylor rule by the inclusion of exchange rate movements
(see Ball (2000)). To improve the macroeconomic performance, the Taylor
rule could take account of excessive exchange rate fluctuations:
rt = r* + α’(πt – π*) + β’(yt – y*) + γ(et – e*),  α’, β’, γ > 0 , (20’)
where e denotes the short-term nominal exchange rate and e* the long-term
equilibrium nominal exchange rate.
At first sight, this extension appears to be reasonable (at least for small
economies) since excessive exchange rate fluctuations involve costs for the
society which are reflected in larger fluctuations in output and inflation. At
second sight, however, doubts may be raised about the appropriateness of
including the exchange rate into the Taylor rule. A key counter-argument is
that the basic Taylor rule already implies that the interest rate is raised during
inflationary exchange-rate-led booms and is decreased during deflationary
exchange-rate-induced busts. Therefore, it may be regarded as unnecessary to
explicitly include the exchange rate into the Taylor rule. Another potential
counter-argument against including the exchange rate into the Taylor rule is
the following: exchange rates are just too volatile, and reacting to exchange
rate misalignments may result in excessive interest rate fluctuations and
therefore be destabilizing. Furthermore, it is nearly impossible to know for
sure whether a given change in exchange rates results from fundamental
factors, non-fundamental factors, or both.
The Taylor rule is attractive because it responds directly to deviations from
central banks’ objectives, in particular from the U.S. Federal Reserve’s
objectives which are price stability and equilibrium utilization rate (Meyer
(2000)). However, implementing this rule requires knowledge of, among
other things, the output gap and the equilibrium real interest rate.
These variables are affected by structural change in the context of
globalization. As a result, there has been increased focus on how Taylor-type
rules should be adjusted in light of the uncertainties associated with structural
changes that are a by-product of the globalization process.
34 Transitory Effect of Globalization: Increase in UncertaintyThe objective of this chapter is to make clear that, transitorily, the structural
changes associated with the globalization process increase the uncertainty
about the current state of the economy – here output and inflation gaps – (see
Section B) and about how the policy instruments affect inflation and
economic activity – the monetary transmission mechanism (Section C).
60 In
particular, we examine the effects of the IT innovations behind globalization.
B. Increase in Uncertainty About the Output and Inflation Gaps
Here, two aspects in particular are highlighted. On the one hand, the structural
changes associated with the globalization process increase the uncertainty
with respect to productivity growth (and hence potential output), and on the
other hand, decrease the information content of the price level. Both increase
the uncertainty with respect to the output gap and the inflation gap.
Uncertainty about the output gap
Implications of the uncertainty about productivity growth
As already briefly mentioned, the IT innovations and globalization can be
regarded as the two main components of the so-called ‘New Economy’
phenomenon. This ‘New Economy’ resembles the pattern of economic
activity in the USA since 1993: there technical progress or innovations
(within a relatively deregulated economy) have led to higher productivity and
economic growth without significant inflation, and to lower fluctuations in
business cycles.
The questions now arise whether these changes will continue; in particular,
whether productivity growth will continue at such a high rate; and whether
this process will spread to other countries or continents? This is important for
a monetary authority to know in order to assess whether it should now react
differently to a booming economy, as the increase in productivity creates the
possibility of high economic growth without inflation or with low inflation.
61
The future development of productivity growth, and (as its basis) innovations,
however, is uncertain and hard to foresee because of natural reasons.
Forecasting innovations largely means, forecasting the future which in itself is
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60 In this chapter we can build upon a body of research recently undertaken on at least some
aspects of our topic, whereas very little literature exists on the topics considered in Section II.
61 In this paper, however, the inflation-suppressing effect has, up to now, been derived without
referring to an increase in productivity growth.uncertain. Therefore there are no clear answers to the question of whether
productivity growth will continue at ahigh rate for example in the USA. It may
be that, over the next few years, the recent higher rates of productivity growth
will persist as, for example, businesses adapt to new technologies such as the
internet. From a longer-term perspective, however, it may be that the USA is
experiencing a shift in the level of productivity rather than in its growth rate.
Hence, policymakers face unavoidable uncertainty concerning both short- and
longer-term productivity prospects. Whether this is a mere level or a growth
rate effect, depends upon whether new technologies such as the internet
represent only process innovations or also lead to (continuing) product
innovations. Mere process innovations tend to lead to labor reductions whereas
product innovations create new activity or production fields.
One should, however, consider that it is not (alone) a technical matter but also
and mainly an institutional matter whether the increase in productivity and
consequently in potential output endures. The reason is that technical progress
can only be made productive if it is accompanied by adequate or necessary
institutional measures or changes. And these changes can be influenced or
produced by good will and good policy.
Any (uncertain) changes in the level or growth rate of productivity per se (to
an uncertain extent) also change the output gap – actual output minus
potential output – if only because they change the supply and the output
potential or target.
62, 63
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62 Vickers (2000) argues that the actual or current output rate may also change. The reason, as
he argues, is that supply shocks are unexpected changes in supply capacity. If the internet, say,
improves productivity, that will arrive as a shock to future productive potential. But once an
improvement to the supply side has come to be anticipated, demand and hence actual output too
may be boosted. This is thought to lead to additional uncertainty with respect to the effects of
unexpected supply shocks on the output gap.
63 There is a well-developed literature on the effect of uncertainty on policy. Recently, several
authors have investigated the implications of incomplete information about potential output for the
conduct and design of monetary policy by studying this issue more formally in quantitative models
of optimal monetary policy (Orphanides (1998), Rudebusch (1999), Ehrmann and Smets (2000),
Swanson (2000), Svensson and Woodford (2000)). In some of these studies, certainty equivalence
continues to hold, even with noisy observations. That is, incomplete information about potential
output does not significantly change results with respect to optimal monetary policy derived in
models with perfect information, as long as the central bank uses its best estimates of the state of
the economy and has the true model of the economy at its disposal. However, one may question
the practical significance of certainty equivalence, which requires that policymakers know the true
model, use an optimal rule, and update their optimal estimate of the NAIRU based on the true
model (Meyer (2000)). These assumptions or requirements put a strong restriction on the results.
Another restriction is that these results, as with most mainstream results in the theory of optimal
monetary policy, very much depend on the linear-quadratic framework used in their approach and
tend to break down when non-linearities or model uncertainty are considered.Implications of the uncertainty about the information content of the price level
The vision of a New Economy, built upon ongoing IT innovations and
globalization (which creates larger markets), implies the expectation of rising
stock values. This may, as recent experience indicates, result in asset price
bubbles. (A bubble here is defined as a process that, for a while, drives an
asset price, in an explosive way, away from its fundamental level.) This,
however, tends to lower the information content of the price level and hence
is of significance for monetary policy (see also and in more detail in the
following section). 
64
Recently, there has been much debate about whether monetary policy makers
should attempt to restrain or ‘prick’ perceived asset price bubbles. A key
question in this context is whether monetary policy should, as part of its pursuit
of inflation and output gap stability, react explicitly to deviations of asset prices
from their steady-state or fundamental levels (see Kent and Lowe (1997),
Bernanke and Gertler (1999), Cogley (1999), Cecchetti et al. (2000)).
65
In consistency with the just mentioned bubble argument, one can argue that
this New Economy (the combination of IT innovations and globalization)
may lead to an increase in (the volatility of) asset prices. Asset prices,
however, as is well known, matter for spending and pricing decisions in goods
markets.
66 This means, even if the central bank assumes that the increase in
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64 In principal, one can differentiate between two questions which are relevant for monetary
policy in this context: first, should financial market stability be included in the central
bank’s target function? Today this is being increasingly affirmed. Second, even if the first question
is not affirmed, the question remains of how should central banks react to asset price movements.
Here we only deal with the second question.
65 Much of this debate has been motivated by the experiences from the U.S. stock market
during the mid and late 1990s. Not only asset prices but also exchange rates are apparently hit by
bubbles. So it may be claimed that the appreciation of the U.S. dollar from 1980 to 1985 was
excessive compared to underlying fundamentals (Okina (1984), and Evans (1986)). In the
following, we refer mainly to asset prices. However, the arguments refer also to exchange rates.
66 One mechanism often cited is that changes in asset prices affect consumption spending via
their effects on household wealth. Empirical studies (Ludvigson and Steindel (1999), Parker
(2000)) have, however, not always found a strong or reliable connection. Another much-cited
mechanism refers to the so-called “balance sheet channel” (Bernanke and Gertler (1995)). This
view maintains that credit markets are not frictionless, and hence cash flows and the condition of
balance sheets are important determinants of agents’ability to borrow and lend. For instance, firms
and households may use assets they hold as collateral when borrowing, in order to improve
information and incentive problems that would otherwise interfere with credit extension. An
increase in asset values, for example, would improve potential borrowers’ access to credit. This
primarily operates on spending and aggregate demand in the short term, although in the longer run
it may also affect aggregate supply by facilitating capital formation and increasing working
capital. There may also be feedback to asset prices, as increasing spending and income, together
with asset purchases, lead to further increases in asset values.potential output is going to continue as a consequence of the New Economy,
67
this does not automatically mean that the output gap (which is one of the
measures we sometimes identify with ‘excess demand’) would be reduced.
68
Not only would potential output (or supply) and therefore the output target be
increased, but demand may also go up, possibly by even more than supply.
This is because of the increase in the volatility of asset prices emphasized
above which may accompany extended periods of upsurges in asset prices.
An increase in asset prices may create excess demand effects insofar as assets
(or wealth) are used as banking collateral. Progress in information
technologies, for example, may lead to speculative appreciation of firms
located in the also-so-called New Economy. This can produce speculative
bubbles and higher investments and output.
Again this means that not only potential output or output capacity but also
actual output may increase. Hence it is uncertain how the output gap develops
as a consequence of a New Economy. For an extended period, demand may
even increase by more than supply, as, for example, stated by Alan Greenspan
in his Humphrey-Hawkins testimony to Congress on February 17, 2000: “the
pickup in productivity tends to create even greater increases in aggregate
demand than in potential aggregate supply.”
69
For the central bank, however, the question then arises of how it should react
to the prospective, uncertain changes in the output gap.
70
Uncertainty about the inflation gap
Implications of the uncertainty about productivity growth
In a range of simple macroeconomic models, the dynamics of inflation
depend, among other things, on the output gap (see McCallum and Nelson
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67 Central banks, however, do not know exactly whether what they see is really the
phenomenon of a continuing structural change named the New Economy or just a longer-than-
usual ongoing cyclical upswing. This upswing could have been based on firms having met an
increase in demand by intensifying resource use beyond normal, sustainable levels thus producing
a kind of cyclical pickup in productivity growth which could slow down after a while.
68 See Vickers (2000) for a more detailed analysis of the argument developed in this section.
69 The increase in demand may not only be based on an increase in asset prices (as described
above) but could also be based or supplemented by other mechanisms (Vickers (2000)).
70 This includes the question of whether it should also change its monetary strategy, perhaps
go over to a nominal income strategy (see Jensen (1999), McCallum and Nelson (2000)).   There
are, however, good arguments for why such changes should only be made if the central bank
thinks that changes are enduring since activist discretionary policy changes are not regarded to be
an optimal way of conducting monetary policy (see Solans (2000)). On the policy implications of
uncertainty see section D. below for more details.(1997), Clarida et al. (1999), and Woodford (1999a)). And in practice, to
achieve their price stability objectives, many central banks use the output gap
as an indicator of future price pressures. Unfortunately, however, potential
output and hence the output gap is unobserved and, as with estimates of other
unobserved variables such as the NAIRU or the equilibrium real interest rate,
there is no obvious way in which it can be defined and estimated.
A positive output gap tends to create rising inflation – as firms reach full
capacity utilization – and an increasing output gap tends to accompany
accelerating inflation, and conversely for negative and falling output gaps.
This kind of framework, which can be built up from microeconomic
foundations, offers a simplified but coherent account of how supply side
developments can affect the paths of nominal variables. A positive supply
shock, such as unexpectedly higher productivity growth, here reduces the
output gap and thus lowers the path of inflation for a given path of nominal
interest rates.
At first sight, it may seem certain that the IT innovations, which are the
technological basis of today’s globalization process, by producing a positive
productivity or supply shock, will moderate inflation. Moreover, it may
appear likely that they also reduce the NAIRU via effects on product market
competition and by improving the efficiency of matching people to jobs in the
labor market (Wadhwani (2000)).
However, as noted earlier, supply shocks are unexpected changes in supply
capacity, and once an improvement to the supply side is anticipated, demand,
and hence actual output too, may be raised. Thus the effects of unexpected
supply shocks, such as the internet, on the output gap are uncertain and so,
therefore, are the effects on the inflation gap.
Implications of the uncertainty about the information content of the price level
As described above, a New Economy may imply the expectation of rising
(volatility of) asset prices. Asset prices, however, are regarded to be a relevant
variable for forecasting inflation insofar as they matter for spending and
pricing decisions in goods markets. A question raised recently in this context
is whether this implies that inflation-targeting central banks should respond to
asset prices or exchange rates specifically.
Anumber of economists, including recently Bernanke and Gertler (1999) and
Vickers (1999), have argued that it is sufficient if policy makers respond to
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prices.
71 The main argument is that it is nearly impossible to know for sure
whether a given change in asset values results from fundamental factors,
nonfundamental factors, or both. Inflation targeting would imply that interest
rates tend to rise during inflationary asset price booms and fall during
deflationary asset price busts. Hence this approach will allegedly reduce the
potential for financial panics.
72
This obviously is the predominant view today, not only among academics but
also among central bankers: it states that central banks should set interest
rates in response to actual or forecast inflation, and possibly also in response
to the output gap, but should not react systematically to asset price (or
exchange rate) developments. The reasoning behind this position is, as noted
earlier, that asset prices (including exchange rates) are too volatile and that
reacting to asset price misalignments may be destabilizing.
However, there are also significant counter-arguments to this position.
Cecchetti et al. (2000), for example, maintain that there is a gain in
macroeconomic performance if policy makers respond separately to asset
prices in a monetary policy rule over and above the expected inflation term.
Cecchetti et al. argue that when bubbles burst, there can be significant
economic damage. Therefore it is necessary to try to limit the emergence of
asset price misalignments. This should be done by leaning against emerging
asset price alignments, even if this causes a short-term deviation from the
inflation goal. A policy rule which explicitly includes asset prices
73 would
limit moral hazard problems because monetary policy would react
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71 A main counter-argument, however, is that there are multiple inflation prognoses and
expectations if there is a bubble.
72 Bernanke and Gertler (1999) maintain that central banks should view price stability and
financial stability (of which one important dimension is increased volatility in asset prices) as highly
complementary and mutually consistent objectives, to be pursued within a unified policy
framework, and they think the best framework is a regime of flexible inflation targeting. The
key-advantage of such a regime is that it induces policymakers to automatically adjust interest rates
in astabilizing direction in the face of asset-price instability: because asset price increases stimulate
aggregate demand and asset price declines dampen it, the strong focus of inflation-targeting central
banks on stabilizing demand will result in “leaning against the wind”, raising interest rates when
asset prices rise and reducing them when they fall. The logic of inflation targeting would imply that
central banks should ignore movements in stock prices which apparently do not generate
inflationary or deflationary pressures.
73 As we have shown in the introduction, the simple Taylor rule could easily be augmented
to include a link between interest rates and exchange rate or asset price alignments. This would
have implied higher short-term interest rates in situations over recent years, at least in the United
States.symmetrically to asset price movements. When price changes originate in
asset markets, the central bank may need to react in order to counter the
effects on inflation. This could arise with a change in the equity risk premium
(the difference between the return that investors require on equities relative to
bonds). Recent surveys indicate that U.S. equity holders used to expect annual
returns of 10-12 percent which was significantly higher than implied by the
equity risk premium (see Cecchetti et al. (2000)). This suggested above-
average risk to holding U.S. equities.
All the studies mentioned here, however, agree that it is appropriate to
respond to asset prices (including exchange rates) in some way; however, the
question is open whether expected inflation serves as a sufficient statistic for
the effects of asset prices on welfare, so that, given expected inflation, there
is no role for asset prices in monetary authorities’reaction functions.
C. Increase in the Uncertainty About the Transmission Mechanism
Increase in the use of e-money
We have defined globalization as a process of growing economic
interdependence which results partly from the rapid and widespread diffusion
of new technologies. One of these new technologies is e-money. The
increasing use of e-money, however, clouds the significance of conventional
monetary aggregates. When the significance of conventional monetary
aggregates weakens, the central bank becomes more uncertain about the
monetary transmission mechanism, i.e. about how the monetary instruments
affect inflation and economic activity, in terms of both size and timing.
Previous financial innovations, such as mutual funds that allow checks to be
written against deposits, have already impaired the central banks’ ability to
control monetary aggregates such as M2. Monetary policy’s power may
weaken further as stored-value cards and online cash substitutes catch on,
creating ‘electronic money’ beyond the direct control of central banks. In
addition, because more transactions will bypass banks, the central banks’
ability to set the required reserve ratio may have less effect on the economy.
The question which has recently been raised and has now attracted
widespread attention is whether technological innovations will hamper the
central banks’ ability to carry out operations that reliably affect economic
activity in the usual sense of real output and/or price inflation (Friedman
(1999, 2000)). The threat to monetary policy from the electronic revolution in
banking is seen in “...the possibility of a ‘decoupling’of the operations of the
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transacted in ways that, at some operative margin, affect the decisions of
households and firms on such matters as how much to spend (and on what),
how much (and what) to produce, and what to pay for ordinary goods and
services” (Friedman (2000, p. 2); emphasis in the original).
74 Coupling, at the
margin, of operations by the central bank and the decisions of households and
firms, however, is crucial to monetary influence over output and/or prices, as
all standard theories of how monetary policy works maintain. Since this is an
argument referring to coupling at the margin, the threat of decoupling is not
dependent upon the extreme assumption sometimes made that, in the future,
possibly nobody will use currency for ordinary economic transactions any
more.
75
A main counter-argument to the hypothesis in this discussion is that central
banks can always anchor the entire structure of interest rates by being willing
to lend to the private economy (via banks) in potentially infinite volume.
76
This procedure, however, may involve central banks in potentially very large
transactions which may produce instrument instability. This potential problem
may be weakened by the fact that apparently modern financial markets react
more sensitively to possible changes in monetary policy (Issing (1996)).
Nevertheless, the central question remains of how a central bank can anchor
the structure of interest rates by means of only very small transactions
compared to the size of its economy or its financial markets. One possible
answer is given by Goodhart (2000, p. 27): “Because the other players in the
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74 In other words, the issue is “whether the expansion or contraction of that quantity, or the
increase or decrease of the exchange rate on central bank liabilities against some other asset,
would continue to be connected to the expansion or contraction of economic activity and to the
broader constellation of interest rates and asset values that matter for this purpose” (Friedman
(2000, p. 9)).
75 This is not actually likely since, if regarded to be a problem, an easy solution for this would
be to require all government tax payments to be made in central bank liabilities. Even without this
obligation, central bank money (currency) will not vanish as it has the advantage, as against e-
money, of absolute anonymity, which is important for many people when carrying out cash
payments. Moreover, currency is and will be the only riskless asset which implies the ultimate
source of confidence.
76 See Woodford (2000a). Woodford argues that central banks can successfully steer
economies even in a world where cash is disappearing. The reason is that a central bank can set
monetary policy by controlling interest rates (by lending/borrowing e-money above/below the
current market interest rate), rather than by altering the currency supply. In other words, reserve
requirements are not an essential part of monetary policy. This, however, does not exactly hit the
point that some economists, such as Friedman (2000), have in mind when they claim that
electronic advances in banking practices may present complications for central banks, perhaps
even to the point of threatening the efficacy of monetary policy influence over inflation and
economic activity. For this, see above.money market, whether banks or not, know that the Central Bank has the
power of the government behind it, it is actually unlikely that the Central
Bank will normally have to undertake a large volume of open market
operations to get the market to adjust interest rates in line with its wishes.
Open mouth policy will normally suffice”. But, as Friedman (2000, p. 16)
emphasizes, “...what if the market loses its presumption that the central bank
could, or would, be able to do the job if the market did not simply act on its
signals? With nothing to back up the central bank’s expressions of intent,
I suspect that in time the market would cease to do the central bank’s work
for it. This prospect is ultimately what the threat posed to monetary policy by
the electronic revolution is all about”.
77
Effect on inflation
In the following, we derive the effects of an increase in uncertainty about the
monetary transmission mechanism on inflation by referring to the basic
model presented in chapter II. Since it was noted by Brainard (1967),
uncertainties about the transmission mechanism are registered not only with
the help of additive shocks, but above all by taking into account uncertainty
about the multipliers. Therefore we replace equation (3) in the basic model by
the following modified version:
78
π = η⋅m +v    with E(η) = 1, ση
2 = const. , σvη = σεη = σvε = 0 (3a)
For inflation with an optimal (active) policy rule we find the solution:
πO = +  (21)
For the derivation see Appendix II.
Transitory Effect of Globalization: Increase in Uncertainty 43
77 I do not want to go further into this debate. I just wanted to make clear that the assumption,
that the financial innovations which enhance the globalization process will increase the
uncertainty about the monetary transmission mechanism, is not void or implausible (see also
Taylor (1998) on this point). What can be said with certainty is that an increase in the use of
e-money will, in addition to reducing seigniorage incomes, reduce the stability of money demand
and worsen the indicator quality of conventional monetary aggregates.
78 This model variation is also used by Letterie and Lippi (1999). However, these authors are
primarily occupied with the welfare effects of instrument uncertainty with discretionary monetary
policy. In contrast to this, we shall explicitly compare the rule-bound solution with the
discretionary solution in the following. Moreover, contrary to Letterie and Lippi (1999), the
existence of supply shocks is taken into account and it is also assumed that the socially desired
inflation rate (π*) is not necessarily zero.With discretionary policy it follows for inflation:
πD = πO + (22)
Again, see Appendix II for the derivation.
From this, we can derive
79 that, on the one hand, an increase in multiplier
uncertainty (i.e., an increase in ση
2) leads to a reduction in the inflation bias.
The following applies:
E(πD) – E(πO) =  > 0 (23)
On the other hand, we find, that, if a (n optimal) policy rule
80 is pursued,
inflation, on average, falls below the socially desired rate of inflation, if π* > 0.
The following applies:
E(πO) =  < π* , with  < 0 , when π* > 0 (24)
This undercutting must not be interpreted in the sense of an incentive to
depart from the rule solution, because the rule solution consists exactly of
this. The rule solution is not time-consistent (E(πD) > E(πO)), as we have seen
above. The time-consistent solution consists of the discretionary policy,
which on average leads to a rate of inflation which is above the rule solution.
The rule-based policy, however, is superior to the discretionary policy from
the aspect of welfare theory (LD > LO).
Summary
In Section C, we have argued that the central bank will become more
uncertain about the transmission mechanism as e-money is increasingly used.
Hence, the central bank will also become more uncertain about the optimal
reaction parameters in the Taylor rule. In the same section, however, we have
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79 For the derivation of these findings it is assumed that the money supply is fixed by the
government before η can be identified.
80 Optimal here means the best of the alternative rules.also shown that this increase in the uncertainty about the monetary policy
transmission mechanism itself tends to decrease the inflation rate.
81
D. Policy Implications
In Sections B and C we have argued that the structural changes (in particular
the IT innovations) associated with the globalization process increase the
uncertainty about the output and inflation gaps and the transmission
mechanism of monetary policy.
82
What policy implications can be drawn from this? Here we concentrate on
some strategic implications.
83
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81 Over and above this, not only the uncertainty with respect to the monetary transmission
mechanism increases, but also the transmission mechanism itself changes systematically as
globalization leads to open capital markets. The change goes in the direction where the exchange
rate channel with respect to the transmission of monetary impulses will become more important.
What implications does this have for monetary policy? As economic theory suggests, opening an
economy reduces the ability of its monetary policy to affect output, while increasing its effects on
inflation (see Karras (1999)). This theoretical prediction has also been supported by empirical
results (ibid).
82 In addition, one could also suppose that globalization increases the complexity of the real
economy and, as aconsequence, transitorily the central bank has less understanding of the economic
structure. Moreover, if the IT-Revolution is actually changing the economic structure itself, the
model uncertainty will increase. The question, then, is what consequence this would or should have
for monetary policy. The research on this issue, however, has only just begun (see Taylor (1998),
Sargent (1999), Hansen and Sargent (2000)), and no clear academic consensus has yet been reached.
83 We could also add instrumental and institutional implications. For example, in an
environment which tends to be prone to changes of mood, monetary policy must have a set of
instruments which enables it to steer the provision of central bank money as precisely as possible
without giving false and undesired signals. Direct measures appear to be inappropriate in such an
environment, and also the room for selective interference of monetary policy becomes smaller
through globalization (Issing (1996)). As a consequence, today the operative implementation of
monetary policy is based on open market policy worldwide. Another example, which concerns the
institutional implications, relates to central bank independence. One could argue that an increase
in uncertainty about the monetary policy transmission mechanism would reaffirm the above
conclusion (in Section II.C) that reducing central bank independence would be a dangerous route
to take. Why? Because, when there is an increase in uncertainty about the transmission
mechanism, then the transparency, about what the central bank really does affect, declines.
Therefore, the accountability of the central bank vis-à-vis the public, also declines. Thus the public
can function less effectively as a corrective against inflation bias tendencies. Hence, short-term
pressures by government and other private interest groups on the central bank, to finance public
goods or ‘election gifts’and to bail out groups or regions hit by adverse shocks, by printing money,
may rise, in particular in developing and transitional economies (see Wagner (1999c)). If not
compensatable by an increase in transparency through other channels, this can only be resisted by
a price-stability-oriented (actually) independent central bank.Policy rules
When uncertainty about the significance of the indicators and the
transmission mechanism of monetary policy increases, the conventional
lesson derived from the Brainard rule (1967) tells us that the central bank
should become more cautious and thus less active. That is, the central bank’s
modified reaction function should then typically place less weight on certain
variables as their parameters become more uncertain. In our  above approach,
this means that β  and α  decline. However, it is known that ‘Brainard’s
conservatism principle’
84 is not universally robust, but depends upon the exact
form of parameter uncertainty. Recent literature has emphasized
circumstances in which parameter uncertainty should lead policy-makers to
vary their policy instrument more than would be optimal in the absence of
such uncertainty (Smets (1998), Giannoni (1999), Onatski and Stock (1999),
Lansing (2000), Meyer, Swanson and Wieland (2001)).
Another issue is economic data uncertainty. It is argued that, for the case of
multiple additive uncertainties which require different policy responses,
measurement error also requires a more conservative policy reaction (Aoki
(1999)). For instance, when the measured value of the rate of inflation
increases, it is not clear whether this reflects a supply shock, or a demand
shock, or is simply a measurement error. Let us suppose that the objectives of
the central bank are not only to prevent inflation but also to maintain the
stability of real GDP. In this case, the central bank may make a policy mistake
if it substantially increases interest rates because it believes that the increase
in the inflation rate is completely due to a demand shock although it is
actually because of a measurement error (Bank of Japan (2001)).
Accordingly, a central bank may be well advised to keep its monetary policy
reaction more ‘conservative’ than in the case when there is no measurement
error.
Moreover, increases in uncertainty about the significance of the indicators
and the transmission mechanism of monetary policy could suggest that the
central bank should then follow a rule-based policy in order to anchor the
expectations of the private sector (and thus to make monetary policy more
calculable and to support the price and interest development with a strong
46 Transitory Effect of Globalization: Increase in Uncertainty
84 This principle says that uncertainty about key parameters describing the transmission of
monetary policy provides a rationale for an ‘attenuated’ approach to monetary policy-making in
the sense of reacting less vigorously to incoming information than would be optimal if such
uncertainty did not exist.nominal anchor) and to force the central bank into a self-commitment in its
monetary policy (see Issing (1996)).
The prior polarization between rules and discretion in a central bank’s
practices, however, has meanwhile faded away. At least, a ‘pure monetary
rule’ is no longer considered to be an appropriate response to the new
challenges of global economic integration.
85This trend can also be recognized
in the theory of monetary policy, where nowadays more flexible definitions
of rules are accepted. This is reflected in definitions such as Taylor’s ‘rule-
like behavior’. Taylor suggests that rule-like behaviour is systematic in the
sense of methodical, according to a plan, and not casual or at random (Taylor
(1993)). And it also is reflected in a new strand of theory of optimal monetary
policy (see Woodford (1999b, 2000b)) which is called timeless perspective
mode of monetary policy-making (see McCallum and Nelson (2000),
McCallum (2000)).
On the whole, however, the views in the literature about the implications of
an increase in uncertainty for monetary policy are non-uniform today. What
the ECB (2001) recently has stated to be the key findings of research
concerning the appropriate conduct of monetary policy in an uncertain
environment, can at most be considered to be the present mainstream view.
The ECB emphasizes three aspects:
86
First, when data or key features of the monetary policy transmission process
are subject to uncertainty, the central bank should (under a broad set of
circumstances) pursue attenuated and nonactivist policies directed at the
medium term.
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85 “A pure monetary rule, which implies automatism, rigidity and simplicity, would not work
in an uncertain environment and would, therefore, be an inappropriate monetary policy response.
(...) If the degree of novelty and uncertainty is very high, even contingency rules might not provide
an appropriate answer.” (Solans (2000, p. 6))
Furthermore, a policy lesson which is sometimes drawn from the fact of uncertain future
productivity growth is that when facing a potential shift in productivity growth, central banks
should be particularly flexible and operate in a pragmatic fashion when exploring the limits to
noninflationary growth. In particular, they should place less emphasis on constructs such as the
output gap which depends on assumptions about trend productivity growth (see e.g. IMF, World
Economic Outlook 2000, p. 80). The reason is that, in a situation when future productivity growth
is highly uncertain, the danger or costs of maintaining an inappropriate policy rise rapidly with
time.
86 An open question is whether all the uncertainties pointed out by the ECB are increased by
globalization to the same extent.Second, in the presence of data and model uncertainty, monetary policy should
be ‘robust’. “This suggests that central banks should not, in general, rely
exclusively on any particular individual indicator or model in isolation (be it
a particular monetary aggregate, a measure of the output gap or a particular
model-based inflation forecast). Instead, central banks need to cross-check
information from different sources against the full set of available
information.” (ECB (2001, p. 50)) Robustness, however, can also mean, to
adopt policies which are capable of delivering reasonably good outcomes
under a range of alternative plausible models of economic structures.
Third, central banks should try to gain credibility for their monetary policies.
Credibility with regard to a well-understood objective is considered to help to
provide a clear and reliable anchor for expectations and to reduce strategic
uncertainty in the economy.
A precondition for the third requirement, however, is appropriate
communication with the public. This is particularly necessary with ongoing
globalization. We shall discuss this in more detail in the following.
Transparency and communication
One of the main vehicles of today’s globalization process has been the
continuing progress in information technology. Modern information
technology, however, has produced the side-effect that today news spreads
much faster than a decade or more ago.
87 This creates a new challenge for the
monetary policy or authority, as the actions (and words) of central
bank(er)s attract much more and wider-spread attention than before. This
calls for extensive communication and transparency of the central banks
vis-à-vis the public and the financial markets.
The present two-pillar strategy of the ECB for example may be interpreted as
one which fulfills the second of the above-mentioned requirements
(robustness),
88 and, to a lesser extent, the third requirement (credibility). The
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87 On the one hand, this tends to create a global convergence of knowledge across certain
‘upper-class’ or ‘educated’ groups of various countries. On the other hand, at the same time it
produces divergence of knowledge inside countries and across the average-citizens of different
countries. The latter statement is based on the presumption that the percentage of ‘educated’
citizens differs across countries (particularly between industrial and developing countries), and
that information alone does not automatically create knowledge. More details of this latter aspect
can be found in the following.
88 However, one may argue that a robust rule must be a simple rule but this two-pillar strategy
does not really represent a simple rule.ECB is reproached for insufficient transparency or communication, in
particular by the supporters of an inflation-targeting regime. They contend
that (only) ‘direct inflation targeting’has a greater degree of transparency and
hence a more efficient communication policy of central banks (see Svensson
(1997), Bernanke et al. (1998)). Furthermore, they point to the fact that all
central banks that practice direct inflation targeting at present explain and
justify their policies to a wide public (either voluntarily or because of
statutory obligations). Inflation reports are published regularly and exact
reasons are given for any deviations from the inflation target. Svensson (1999,
p. 626) even claims that “[t]he high degree of transparency and accountability
in inflation targeting may then ensure that any concern about the real
economy is consistent with the natural-rate hypotheses and therefore reduces,
or eliminates, any inflation bias, which arguably translates into an output level
target [in the loss function] given by capacity output.”
Therefore, switching to direct inflation targeting could be regarded as an
appropriate answer to the information technology challenge indicated above.
There are, however, some misunderstandings. In standard models of optimal
monetary policy, such as Svensson’s, transparency is usually identified with the
amount or the degree of precision of information that the monetary authority
releases to the public. Greater transparency (in this sense) is then widely argued
to make monetary policy more predictable as well as more effective and credible
in achieving its objectives. Furthermore, it is regarded as facilitating
accountability, which in turn can be regarded as aprecondition for central bank
independence in a democratic society. A recent ECB publication by Winkler
(2000), however, has emphasized, very nicely, that transparency should better
be defined as the degree of genuine understanding of the monetary policy
process and the policy decisions by the public. Assuming that there are frictions
in communication or imperfections in the processing of information,
89 more
information need not always enhance the ‘clarity’ of central bank
communication. Information has to be processed, structured, condensed,
simplified and then put into context in order to become comprehensible.
The costs and benefits of this ‘information preparing’ activity required for
filtering and interpreting information needs to be balanced at the margin in
order to use information efficiently. The optimal degree of clarity therefore
will differ across different agents and across different decision problems.
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89 By comparison, most models of optimal monetary policy discussed in the literature build on
presumptions such as perfect rationality, limited uncertainty, homogenous information, common
knowledge and frictionless communication (Winkler (2000)).By referring to these arguments, one can come to the conclusion that the
presumption, that direct inflation targeting includes a greater degree of
transparency and accountability with such favorable conclusions as alleged
by Svensson (1999), is partly dependent on the fact that traditional (early)
models of direct inflation targeting build on presumptions such as limited
uncertainty (ignoring, in particular, model uncertainty) and other
simplifications which, as noted earlier, assume away communication issues
that are the basis of the alternative definition of transparency used above.
This may be one reason why central banks such as the ECB have refused to
take on this concept of direct inflation targeting as the baseline of their
strategy, despite all the advantages alleged by the supporters of this strategy.
Another reason is that the technical preconditions needed for implementation
of direct inflation targeting are often not fulfilled (see Masson et al. (1997),
and Wagner (1999b, 2000c)). This is particularly the case in developing and
transitional countries.
Nonetheless, all central banks are forced to react to the new challenge coming
from the information technology side. The question is: what can or should
they do? Experiences with communication problems in the context of the
recent decline in the external value of the euro show that saying nothing is
often better (less destabilizing) than saying something that is not fully
understood in its context.
90 Or in other words: neither activism in actions nor
activism in words is required.
Coming back to a previous aspect: Priorities
Finally I would like to come back to a point which we have dealt with already
in the policy implications section of Section II. There we pointed to the
incentives for particular interest groups to urge the central bank to shift its
policy focus to stabilizing the economy.
91 Referring to the Taylor rule above,
this would mean that β/α should increase. One has to consider, however, that
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90 Moreover, experience with the monetary policy course conducted by Alan Greenspan in the
United States appears to show that perhaps things other than transparency are sometimes more
important for successful monetary policy, namely authority and reputation and public appearance.
This means that gaining reputation for a central bank is path-dependent, and problems may arise
if there is a change in leadership, that may change the rules. This fear was one of the reasons for
the constructors of the ECB-law to strongly rely on rigid rules.
91 It is argued that, if inflation declines, the variability of inflation is also limited or decreased
by downward nominal rigidities (Holden (2000)). However, a main argument for aiming at a low
rate of inflation is precisely that low inflation is associated with lower variability (and thus
uncertainty) of inflation (see Fischer (1996)). [Today, avoiding price instability or high inflation
variability is the main goal of many central banks (for example, of the ECB), as price instability or
(continued...)in Section II we have argued that the increase in competition may lead to
higher costs of inflation and hence to a change in the government loss
function, especially to a reduction of the weight given to output stabilization
relative to price level (or inflation) stabilization, b. This may also be
substantiated by an increase in uncertainty about the monetary  transmission
mechanism. Hence, the reaction parameter β may  decline (alternatively
α may increase), as it is dependent on the weight that is given to output
stabilization in the social/government loss function. Therefore, ceteris
paribus, the ratio β/α in the reaction function may tend to decrease.
92
This accords with today’s conviction that monetary policy should concentrate
on its main task, and this is increasingly supposed to be price stabilization (or
prevention of inflation). As we have seen, this is even the case when
globalization tends to suppress inflation pressures. This conclusion may even
be strengthened if the transmission mechanism of monetary policy becomes
more uncertain
93 even though, as we have seen (in Section III.C), this tends
to reduce per se the inflation bias.
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high inflation variability is often associated with bad monetary policy. For example, the Maastricht
Treaty states that the primary objective of the European Central Bank (ECB) shall be to maintain
price stability. It, however, was left to the ECB itself to define price stability, and the ECB has
subsequently announced a target of an annual price increase below two percent. As price stability
is supposed to imply low inflation variability, it is reasonable that the ECB has chosen a low target
for inflation which obviously involves little inflation variability.] Now, as a consequence of the
nominal rigidities, variation in nominal demand induces variation in real output, when downward
rigidity is binding. Hence, it may appear appropriate to adjust monetary policy with a stronger
concentration on output stabilization. And indeed, central banks are often pressured to concentrate,
in such a situation, on other targets such as stabilizing output or employment. In Euroland, the
Maastricht Treaty, for example, is often interpreted as requiring this from the ECB. Article 2 of the
“ECB-law” (Protocol (No. 18) on the Statute of the ESCB and the ECB) states that “the primary
objective of the ESCB shall be to maintain price stability. Without prejudice to the objective of price
stability, it shall support the general economic policies in the Community...” (see
www.ecb.int/about/statescb.htm).
92 This resembles the recent tendency (Wagner (2000a, b)) that central banks do not (have to)
produce as many recessions any more to keep inflation in check. It has been shown that Post-War
U.S. recessions have mainly been triggered by restrictive monetary policies to control inflation
(Romer and Romer (1994)). Such policy-induced recessions are also regarded as accounting for the
continued volatility of the postwar era (Romer (1999)). However, the situation in the United States
in the last eight years, in which the Federal Reserve Bank has not initiated a recession out of fear of
inflation (as previously) in spite of increasing or sustained overheating trends in the labor market,
may serve as a first example for the thesis that globalization (or increased competition)
endogenously tends to reduce output variability (see also Gamber and Hung (2001)). In other words,
there are fewer recessions and they are less severe if inflation is firmly (brought) under control.
93 See Issing (1996, p. 308).IV. Conclusion
We have argued in this paper that globalization and the structural changes,
which are associated with the globalization process, have two main
implications for monetary policy. Firstly, and transitorily, globalization or the
structural changes associated with it (including the IT innovations which are
the technological basis of today’s globalization process) increase uncertainty
about the macroeconomic indicators and data and the transmission
mechanism of monetary policy. In the context of a Taylor rule, this means,
that the uncertainty about the output and inflation gaps, as well as the
uncertainty about the monetary transmission mechanism and hence about the
optimal reaction parameters, increase. Secondly, globalization increases the
locational competition for mobile capital among regions and countries, and
hence, with a certain time lag, tends to decrease (suppress) inflation
(pressures), as inflation itself is regarded as a locational bad.
This implies that, with ongoing globalization, the role of monetary policy,
with respect to price stabilization, may decline. This, however, does not mean
that central bankers will have less incentive to fight inflation, because
globalization – via the increase in locational competition – also increases the
costs of inflation, reflected in the increased danger of a drain of mobile capital
in the case of comparatively high(er) inflation (than in competing countries).
Nor does it mean that central bankers will have an easy or easier job in the
near future, though this may be the case in the long run. In the short to
medium term, however, as we have argued, the structural changes associated
with the globalization process increase the uncertainty surrounding monetary
policy. Therefore, the task of monetary policy for central banks does not
become easier.
In this context, it has also to be considered that globalization itself is
a controversial process in the eyes of the public. Globalization forces open
economies (to a varying extent, depending on the starting conditions) to
implement structural reforms, not only in the financial but also in the goods
and labor markets, and last but not least in the public sector.
94 These reforms,
however, produce asymmetric costs for different social groups. This is likely
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94 In some European countries, this means to bidding farewell to a comfortable social welfare
system.to induce resistance against these reforms and the globalization process in
general. In order to avoid a backsliding into isolation, this may force some
governments to compensate those social groups which are hurt by the
reforms, by social-political measures which are costly. Hence, if not blessed
with higher tax revenues from an increase in productivity and thereby in
economic growth,
95 such societies are running into a target conflict because
the social-political measures have to be financed, either by an increase in
taxes or indebtedness, or by an increase in seigniorage (if not by a reduction
of other expenditures). All of these alternatives are locational bads in the
international competition process.
In other words, the increase in competition, and the globalization process
(which we argued to be the basis for this increase in competition and thereby
for a decline in inflation), do not automatically or inevitably last in the long
term.
96 They have to be accompanied by permanent efforts to defend and
continue painful structural reforms.
Monetary policy can only play a very limited role here. Nonetheless,
monetary authorities should stay alert and try to react in an adequate
(sensitive, not-too-activist) way to the (transitorily) increasing uncertainty
which we have identified as an essential indirect implication of globalization
for monetary policy. By doing this, they can also prepare the way for
globalization to create a New Economy which we have defined as a desired
situation where high economic growth may be accompanied by low (or no)
inflation and low fluctuations in business cycles. Low inflation is a necessary
component of such a New Economy. And here, as we have argued, the
conditions for the monetary authorities to successfully fight inflation are
likely to steadily improve, the more and the longer globalization continues.
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95 This is part of the so-called ‘New Economy-effects’of globalization expected by optimists.
96 See O’Rourke (2000) for an analysis of the decline of the so-called first wave of
globalization a century ago.Appendix I: Supplementary Remarks on the Basic Model of Section II.B
The basic model, which we sketched in Section II.B, assumes the following
timing of events:
(1)  The ‘institutional design stage’: We assume that the government itself
fixes monetary policy.
(2)  The private actors develop their inflation expectations with knowledge
of the objective function and of the constraints (and on the basis of
information on yn) but without knowledge of shocks v and ε.
(3) Finally,  shocks  v and ε are observable for the government.
(4)  With knowledge of these shocks, the government realizes a defined
monetary policy, i.e. it fixes m (which leads to a defined π and y). Given the
existence of a binding commitment technology, the ex post optimum policy
selected in step (4) can only deviate stochastically from a policy which would
be optimum on the basis of information and conditions for action in step (1)
(ex ante optimum policy). However, if there is no such commitment
technology, the ex post optimum policy can also deviate systematically from
the ex ante optimum policy.
Optimal rule
First suppose the policy (rule) is credible and hence enforceable. That is, the
policy maker(s) can make abinding commitment to an optimal state-contingent
policy rule. The optimal inflation rate can then be derived as being:
πO = π * + [b/(1+b)] ε . (5)
Without a commitment technology, such a policy rule cannot be implemented.
Discretion
The adequate timing assumption here is the following: policy is chosen under
“discretion” when the policy instruments are set at stage (4) above, i.e. after
inflation expectations have been formed. To be credible, a policy must now
simultaneously fulfill two conditions: the policy must be ex-post optimal (i.e.,
dL/dπ= 0, given π
eand ε); and expectations must be rational (i.e., π
e= E(π |yn)).
The discretionary inflation rate can be derived as:
πD = π * + b(y* – yn) + [b/(1+b)] ε . (6)
When we compare (5) and (6), we see that there is an inflation bias: b(y*-yn)
with discretionary policy (whereas the employment outcome remains the same
as in the case of the optimal policy rule above, namely y = yn – [1/(1+b)] ε in
both cases).
55Appendix II: Derivations of Equations (21) and (22) in Section III.C
Derivation of equation (21):
The above core model discussed in Section III.C consists of the equations (1),
(2), (3a) and (4).
The timing of events is:
π
e ------- ε,v ------- π ------- η .
That is, money supply is fixed by the monetary authority before η can be
observed. However, v and ε can be observed by the monetary authority, but
they do not have any information content with respect to the multiplier
uncertainty. Therefore, after using the expectations operator on equation (3a)
and noting that E(η) = 1 and σmη = 0, we have:
E(π) = E(η) ⋅ E(m) + σmη = E(m)   and thus π
e = m
e. (25)
Inserting this into equation (2) and calculating y – y* and π – π*, we get
L = E{0,5[(ηm + v – π*)




L = 0,5[(ηm + v – π*)
2 + b(yn – y* + ηm + v – m
e – ε)
2] + λ[m
e – Em] (26’)
where  λ = a Lagrange multiplier for the condition that expectations are
rational.
Differentiation gives:
= η(ηm + v – π*) + ηb(yn + ηm – m
e +v – ε – y*) – λ (27)
= – b(yn + ηm – m
e + v – ε – y*) + λ (28)
To calculate the rationally expected money growth rate, first the expectation
values of the first order conditions have to be constructed.
From E( ) = 0 one gets: λ = b(yn – y*) .
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57E(m) = m




Substituting (29) back into (27) and calculating the ex-post first order
condition, E(| ε,v) = 0, then gives:
mO = +  (30)
and thus
πO = +  . (21)
Derivation of equation (22):
One gets equation (22) by calculating the expectations value of equation (27)
noting that the last term λ is suppressed.
Instead of equation (29) one then gets
E(m) = m




Substituting this back into (27) and calculating the ex-post first order
condition then gives:
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